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THE TAXATION OF RESTRICTED-USE PROPERTY:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
JERRY A. MENIKOFF*
INTRODUCTION

"[I]ncome must be taxed to him who earns it."' This rule, first
announced in the landmark case of Lucas v. Earl,2 has properly been

described as "the first principle of income taxation. '

3

In the wake of

Lucas v. Earl, countless courts and commentators quickly moved to
the task of refining that proposition into a workable rule of law. In

the words of the very metaphor that became a catch-word to the initiated, the law relating to assignments of income was the very ample
fruit produced by Lucas' tree.
The student of property tax is not hard pressed to improvise a
similar aphorism for that field. Such a "first principle" might be
phrased as follows: "The value of property must be taxed to him who
owns it." Unfortunately, this naked statement is not of itself very useful. Like the rule of Lucas v. Earl, it requires further evolution to
develop its applicability. Only then could it be of use in serving its
proper function: one of determining who is to be taxed on the basis
of the ownership of what property rights.
Perhaps because of the lack of a Lucas v. Earl for the property
tax field, first principles have received little attention. Thus, it has
been observed:
Statutory regulation of a unitary taxing system begins in most
states with the fundamental provision that "real property" shall be
taxed to its "owner." Unfortunately, as a guide to those concerned
with the assessment process, the term "owner"' is a highly ambiguous
one ....
The ambiguities of the ownership idea are
compounded by statutory definitions of real property. A common definition is:
"'Real property' includes the land itself... and all rights
and privileges belonging or appertaining thereto."
If, then, "real property" is to be assessed to its "owner," should not
the "owner" of "rights and privileges" be taxed in proportion to the
value of his "rights and privileges"? And is it not clear that a wide
Member New York Bar.
1. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
2. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
3. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
*
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variety of persons may own some "right" or some "privilege"? . . .
Obviously these statutes can be used to justify virtually any action
taken by an assessor

. ..

Answers to the questions posed do exist; they do not, however,
appear directly on the surface of the existing case law. What is needed
is a deeper examination into the fundamental rules that underlie
property taxation, rules that are more specific than the general proposition outlined above. The approach taken here toward determining
those rules centers upon two aspects of the subject that might at first
seem self-evident: one is the concept of a tax on property, while the
other is the definition of property itself.
That a property tax should be influenced by the underlying system of property rights is not very surprising. What is surprising is that
little has been done toward developing this relationship. Much of this
article, therefore, will be centered around various property concepts
and the manner in which they shape the field of property taxation.
At the same time, it is also important to keep in mind that the ultimate subject matter is a tax. Its purpose is to raise revenue, not to define the relationship of rights between two claimants to a piece of land.
This consequence suggests that a blind adherence to the rules laid
down in real property treatises would be inappropriate. The only
sensible approach to this area must involve a blend of concepts from
both tax and property law, with each appropriately modified so as to
achieve a workable union.
While the ultimate goal of this presentation is to develop a theoretical foundation for analysis of property tax issues, too theoretical a
presentation risks losing touch with reality. Consequently, discussion
will concentrate upon a relatively concrete problem: the appropriate
method for taxing properties that are burdened or benefitted by private restrictive agreements. While this particular problem will remain
the focus throughout, it will nevertheless permit the elucidation of a
more general concept that it is hoped will be of use in many aspects
of property taxation.
I.

THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSAL

No property owner is totally free in the exercise of his property
rights. Nuisance laws assure that use of the property will not invade
certain protected interests of neighboring property owners. Similarly,
4. Nichols, Real Property Taxation of Divided Interests in Land, 11 KAN. L. Rnv.
309. 310-11 (1963) (citations omitted).
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zoning laws limit property use in a manner designed to ensure harmonious uses of property in a particular area. Both of these types of
restraints are public restrictions upon private property. They represent a public determination that public welfare will be substantially
advanced by prohibiting the unrestricted use of an individual's
property.
For the purposes of property, taxation, it seems quite proper to
recognize public restrictions in the valuation process. Both the restrictions and the tax are imposed in the name of the state.5 It defies notions of fundamental fairness to imagine that the state can on the one
hand take away the exercise of a property right, and on the other, assess and tax the owner as if he still possessed it. In a legal proceeding
challenging such an assessment, the state should properly be estopped
from maintaining that the restricted use still exists in the hands of the
property owner.6
Property can also be subject to private restrictions: agreements
among landowners that impose restrictions on use over and above any
public regulations. For example, a neighborhood association may require its members to maintain their homes in a certain manner. Or,
a developer of a new community may set aside some land for open
space, and invest residents of that community with the right to ensure
the land is so maintained. Perhaps the most simple example is an easement allowing a property owner to travel over his neighbor's property.
The proper tax consequences of a private restriction are far less
clear than those relating to public restrictions. To the extent that it
has been recognized for tax valuation purposes, the private restriction
has permitted private action to reduce the taxable value of a piece of
property. Of course, such a reduction may be accompanied by an
increase in the taxable value of some other person's property; the
increase, however, will not necessarily equal the reduction. Consequently, the problem confronting taxing authorities may be similar to
that caused by an assignment of income: a loss in total revenue.
What is needed then is an "assignment of income" doctrine for
property taxation, one that answers the following array of questions
suggested by the private restriction:
How should a restrictive agreement affect the assessment of a piece
of real property?
5. The "state" is used here in the sense of the ultimate authority responsible for
the actions of its political subdivisions.
6. See generally Heller, The Theory of Property Taxation and Land Use Restric-

tions, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 751.
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Would it be proper for an assessor to ignore the existence of a re-

strictive covenant, and assess tke property as if it were unencumbered?
Does it matter whether another piece of property is benefitted by the
encumbrance?
If so, is it also important whether the full value lost by one piece of
property as a result of the encumbrance is added to another piece?
Does that other "benefitted" piece of property have to be improved
solely as a result of the owner's contractual rights? Or are contractual
rights irrelevant?
May a property owner oppose an assessment on the ground that
rights attributed to him are being taxed to someone else?
To what extent should the property tax system ordinarily take account of the interaction between pieces of property?
The ultimate conclusion reached herein is that private restrictive
agreements can and should be ignored in the valuation of burdened
property. Every unit of real property should be valued 6s if the rights
appurtaining to it could be freely exercised. To do otherwise would
allow erosion of the tax base. While this result might seem inequitable, in that it taxes a property owner on rights that he has surrendered, it is in fact fully consistent with more general themes in the
property tax arena that run counter to principles of equity.7 Indeed,
what is suggested here is the recognition of the following as a "first
principle" of property taxation:
The basic legal unit for valuation purposes is the fee simple. Every

property right is part of exactly one fee simple, and should be taxed
as part of that fee simple.
The use of the fee simple as a compartmentalization device serves a
number of purposes in addition to preserving the tax base. It both
allows for the consistent valuation of property rights, and greatly increases the administrative efficiency of the system.
A counterpart of the rule just announced should also be noted
at the outset: nothing in the above analysis requires that agreements
among landowners be ignored in assessing properties whose values are
increased by the existence of the agreement. Admittedly, taxing property rights according to fee simple interests does mean that the owner
7. For example, in striving for an objective measure of value, property tax systems
will usually ignore circumstances personal to a property owner. Thus, a person who
uses his property poorly, leases it at a rate less than what the market will support, or
sells it below market value, will end up paying a property tax disproportionate to the
value he obtains from the property.

PROPERTY TAX

of, a benefitted property cannot be taxed on the value of rights that
have been imputed to the owner of a burdened property. It is quite
another matter, however, to recognize that a restrictive agreement may
alter the use of burdened property in such a way as to increase the
value of rights that are a part of the benefitted property owner's fee
simple. The failure to perceive this distinction-that there is a conceptual difference between A's being taxed on B's right, and A's being
taxed on the increase in value of his own rights resulting from the restriction on B's right-is a frequent source of confusion in the prop8
erty tax area.
An understanding of the following valuation rule, which is an
extension of the "first principle" categorization concept suggested
above, should minimize confusion:
The value of the rights contained within any fee simple cannot be
measured without reference to the manner in which rights attached
to neighboring properties are used. More simply, property can only
be valued in the context of its surrounding environment. How that
environment came to be the way it is, whether by the voluntary actions of neighboring landowners, or by the use of incentives created
by the owner of the fee simple to be assessed, is irrelevant.
Again, much of this article is intended to explain this statement, and
to demonstrate its place in the structure of the property tax system.
II. A CASE STUDY: THE NEW YORK RULE FOR
THE TAXATION OF EASEMENTS

An easement is a property right that permits its possessor to restrict the uses to which a piece of property may otherwise be put.9 It
may be negative in nature, such as prohibiting any construction on the
encumbered land, or it may be affirmative, such as granting the easement owner the right to travel upon the land. In either instance, it
effectively limits the property owner's exercise of his rights and thus
provides a typical example of a restrictive agreement.
One easement in particular-the easement appurtenant-deserves
singular treatment. The benefits of such an easement accrue not to an
individual, but rather to a specific piece of property. 10 When that
benefitted property is sold, the adjunct easement rights accompany
8. See text accompanying notes 9-49 infra.
9. 2 AMiERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY § 8.5 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
10. See id. § 8.71 (citing 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 487, comment a

(1944) ).
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it. Under these circumstances, the easement interest itself can be envisioned as a real property interest-one attaching to the benefitted
estate. As a result, the creation of an easement presumably does not
remove any interest from the scope of a property tax imposed upon
all real property; it merely transfers a right from one property to another. This outcome contrasts markedly with the treatment accorded
to leasehold interests, which are personal property and thus exempt
from a tax on real property."
These characteristics of easements appurtenant have caused them
to receive unique treatment for property tax valuation purposes. 12 Unlike other restrictions on the use of property, the legal treatment of
which is often subject to confusion,' 3 it is uniformly recognized that
an easement can be taken into consideration in valuing a servient
tenement.' 4 While the thesis of this article is that easements have generally been treated incorrectly, an examination of that treatment may
nevertheless prove fruitful.
The present construction of easement interests is founded upon
New York case law. The general New York rule with respect to restrictions on the fee holder's use of his property is best stated in the
11. For example, in Fort Hamilton Manor, Inc. v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 192, 149
N.E.2d 856, 173 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1958), the taxpayer leased portions of the Fort Hamilton
Military Reservation from the federal government. Under applicable federal law, and
the terms of the lease, the United States waived its exemption from local property taxes,
and the lessee assumed an obligation to pay those taxes. Nonetheless, the New York
Court of Appeals determined that no taxes were owing on the leasehold interest, for it
was personal property, and thus not encompassed by the state's tax on real property.
12. Henceforth, following the spirit of the case law, "easement" will be used as
shorthand for appurtenant easements. An easement "ingross," which does not benefit
specific property, receives very different tax treatment. See, e.g., Supervisor of Assessments v. Bay Ridge Prop., Inc., 270 Md. 216, 225-26, 310 A.2d 773, 778 (1973).
13. Compare Bensalem Township School Dist. v. County Comm'rs 8 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 411, 303 A.2d 258 (1973) with Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland, 16 A.D.2d
223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1044, 190 N.E.2d 239, 239 N.Y.S.2d
878 (1963). In Bensalem Township, the Pennsylvania legislature had passed a statute
allowing counties to contract with landowners to preserve properties in their undeveloped
state; land governed by such covenants would thereafter be assessed at the lower value
representing its restricted status. The court rejected the contention of a school district
that the tax statute was unconstitutional, and instead determined that the law merely
recognized that the restrictive agreements were proper elements in determining the
value of land.
A very different attitude was exhibited in Knickerbocker Village, where a public
housing company argued that statutory restrictions on the saleability of a particular
project should be taken into account by the assessing authorities. The court thero determined that since the regulation applied only to the housing company, and not to
subsequent owners of the property, it was "personal" to the owner, and should not be
included in the valuation process.
14. See 5 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 509, comment d (1944).
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1962 case of People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Commission,15 where the Appellate Division observed:
Except in cases of easement interests, a division of ownership or
the independent holding of separate legal interests in taxable prop-

erty will not affect the mode of assessment. For instance, mortgagor
and mortgagee interests, vendor and vendee interests, landlord and
tenant interests, life tenant and remainder interests and co-tenant interests are not separately assessed. . . Thus, in any case, a single

assessment of the property, at its full value, as if not subject to a
mortgage, a vendor interest, a lease, a remainder or co-tenancy, is

all that is required. 16

Given this remarkably broad rule, the introductory phrase, "[e]xcept in cases of easement interests," is rather intriguing. Why have
New York courts singled out the easement as the only type of interest
worthy of exceptional treatment? Is it because of its nature as a "real"
property interest? Professor Bonbright attempted to answer this question and was able to conclude only that "[w]hy the easement should
have received exceptional treatment we are unable to say."' 17 The Gale
court, although quite aware of Professor Bonbright's mystification,
could answer only that
it is the settled rule that, where real property is subject to an easement, the value of the property for tax purposes is to be fixed bearing in mind the outstanding easement interest. The market value of
the servient estate is lessened by virtue of its being subject to the easement and the value of the dominant estate
is to be increased by vir8
tue of having the benefit of the easement.'
The court then justified this rule on the ground that the purpose of
the tax law was to value property at its full value.' 9 Exactly how this
statement led to a treatment of easements different from that accorded
a wide array of other split interests, which the court had just concluded were to be ignored in fixing values, was left to conjecture.
The rule stated in Gale had its beginning in People ex rel. Poor
v. Wells,20 a 1910 Appellate Division case adopting per curium the
Special Term opinion. In Poor, the court addressed the question of
15.
16.
17.
18.

17 A.D.2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1962).
Id. at 228-29, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 (footnote omitted).
(1937).
1 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 497
17 A.D.2d at 228 n.*, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05 n.* .

19. Id.

20. 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36, aff'd per curiam, 200 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E. 1129
(1910).
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whether the land on which Gramercy Park was located had any value
for tax purposes. The original landowner, wishing to donate a park
to the residents of his neighborhood, had voluntarily subjected his
land to *easements on the part of all landowners in that neighborhood,
each of whom he granted a legally enforceable right to demand that
21
the land remain as a park.
The court initially observed that the tax commissioners had, since
the creation of the park, included the full value of the park privileges
which accompanied the easements, in the value of the lots surrounding the park. This treatment had the effect of raising the value of
these benefitted lots above the value of similar lots not enjoying park
privileges. Furthermore, the aggregate of the "excess" valuation of the
benefitted lots "amount[ed] to more than what would be the full value
of the land embraced within the limits of the park if the same could
22
be sold free and unencumbered."
Having thus determined that, in its view, the city was not losing
tax revenue as a result of the arrangement-to the contrary, its tax
base had increased somewhat-the court then evaluated the park-owner's contention that:
when an easement is carved out of one property for the benefit of
another the market value of the servient estate is thereby lessened
and that of the dominant increased practically by just the value of
the easement; the respective tenements should thereafter be assessed
accordingly; the determinate question of the assessable value of each
of the properties affected being its market value or
the amount for
23
which it would sell under ordinary circumstances.
The court concluded that since the assessing authorities had already
chosen to recognize the benefit accruing to the dominant tenements,
they were effectively estopped from not adhering to the rest of plaintiffs' syllogism. Thus, it required that the assessed value of the servient
estate, in this case the park, be calculated subject to the restrictions.
The main emphasis of the opinion centers around the single fact
that the court no doubt found conclusive; the market value of the
property had decreased as a result of the easement. Nevertheless, the
court did note the consequences of the arrangement as they affected
the city's tax base. Unfortunately, nothing in the opinion gives any
indication of the significance of this factor. Had the arrangement
21. Id. at 84-85, 124 N.Y.S. at 37.
22. Id. at 86, 124 N.Y.S. at 37-38.
23. Id. at 87, 124 N.Y.S. at 38.
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caused the city to lose revenue, would the court have allowed the assdssors, to tax the park as if it were totally unrestricted? If so, under
what general principle?
The relevance of the actions of the authorities is also left unclear.
Would the outcome have differed if the assessors had chosen not to
tax the surrounding homes on the increases in value stemming from
the easements? Or, alternatively, would the outcome have differed had
the homes been taxed on an amount insufficient to offset the revenue
lost as a result of the decrease in market value of the park?
Ultimately, the factors relating to the possible loss of revenue
and the choice made by the assessors appear to have been treated by
the court as giving rise to an equitable estoppel: the city chose to view
the easement interest as having been transferred to another property.
Moreover, it benefitted from that choice, and therefore could not complain about it. While this argument seems superficially plausible, it
in fact rests upon an unstated premise of questionable validity, namely,
that in complaining about the overassessment of his own property,
24
the taxpayer can bring into issue the assessments of other properties.
In what sense is the assessment of one piece of property to be related
to that of another? What is there about the nature of the property tax
system that requires--or even allows-a property owner to benefit, by
having his assessment reduced, from the positive effects the use of his
own property has had on other pieces of property? These questions
underlie the argument that was accepted in Poor:the park was not to
be assessed precisely because its "value" was being assessed to other
property owners.
The argument might appear to be one merely about who should
be paying a tax; as such, the problem would not be terribly serious.
From the taxpayer's point of view contractual agreements could settle
who would ultimately be liable for the tax. And, from point of view
of the taxing jurisdiction, there is no reason to suspect that owners of
dominant tenements are any more or less financially solvent than owners of servient tenements. The Poor court itself seems to treat the issue
as one of choosing the taxpayer. Its treatment of the easement as something that is "carved" out of one property, and transferable to another,
suggests that the easement is some sort of physical entity, with a corresponding market value.
24. This, of course, is not to say that it is improper for a taxpayer to use the
assessments of other properties as evidence of the proper assessment ratio to be applied
to his own property.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

In fact, much more is at stake. An easement is not a physical unit,
and it is imprecise to speak of it as such. Hohfeld has more accurately
characterized easements as
aggregates of right (or claims), privileges, powers and immunities
vested in the "owner" of the interest .... For this reason it is a

serious obstacle to close analysis and clear thinking that courts and
writers habitually deal with the easement (as they do with all other
legal interests) as if it were a simple unity to be described adequately
by a few loose and ambiguous terms ....25

Once one overcomes the fiction of treating the easement as a physical
entity, it is easy to recognize the flaws in treating the easement as having "a value," and in assuming that value to be transferred from one
unit of property to another.
It is not difficult to hypothesize cases in which the value lost by
a servient tenement is not offset by the increase in value of the dominant tenement. Consider, for example, a situation in which a hypersensitive property owner is willing to pay his neighbor to discontinue
some productive activity he finds irritating. Under the objective standard of valuation subscribed to by all taxing jurisdictions, the value of
the sensitive neighbor's land will increase minimally, if at all, as a result of the easement. On the other hand, the value of the burdened
land could easily be reduced to zero.26
Admittedly, this hypothesis does not present the most common
type of easement. In most instances, an easement will be purchased
25.

HOHFELD,

Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, in

LEGAL CONCEPTIONS

FUNDA51ENTAL

162-63 (1923).

26. Most commentators in the property tax area have been quick to recognize the
error in equating the gains and losses resulting from the creation of an easement. Professor Bonbright's comments are typical:
One should note that there is no necessary equivalence between the damage
a landowner suffers by being subjected to an easement and the benefit other
land obtains from that easement. An easement of passage over A's forest land
to the road may greatly enhance the value of B's hotel property without correspondingly depreciating A's land; while on the other hand an easement of
light over C's lot may merely make D's backyard slightly pleasanter while preventing C from building an apartment house.
I J. BONORIGHT, supra note 17, at 497. Indeed, even strong advocates of the recognition of easements (and other restrictions) for valuation purposes have admitted that the
non-equivalence of the benefits and burdens of an easement presents serious problems:
While it is generally true that the sum of the values of separate interests, as
measured by their market price, will be equivalent to the value of the entire
fee, there are some notable exceptions ...
The assessment difficulties . . . cannot reasonably be avoided by assessing
each owner only in accordance with the market value of his interest ....
Nichols, supra note 4, at 328.
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only when the buyer's potential economic gain exceeds the cost of
purchase; presumably that gain will be reflected in the market value
of his property. Note, however, that even if this were true at the easement's creation, a change in conditions might eventually lower the
value of the easement. Should a taxing jurisdiction be forced to take
that risk? Or, should it be allowed to continue to assess the dominant
tenement at its value as of the time of the easement's creation?
Even if there is no change in conditions, an easement that is
"efficient" from the viewpoint of the private parties may ultimately
lower the county or city's overall tax base. In Poor, for instance, there
was a possibility that the city's tax base had deteriorated as a result of
the arrangement. In that case the increased valuations of neighboring
properties more than equaled the value of the parkland if used most
efficiently. The restrictions on the parkland, however, did not merely
deprive the city of the taxable value of the land itself; they also ensured that there would never be any development of that land, and
thus deprived the city of potentially taxable improvements.
While it might have been hoped that future decisions would show
an increasingly sophisticated approach toward valuation of easements,
such was not to be the case. Within a year of Poor the New York
courts decided a second easement case, People ex rel. Topping v.
Purdy, where the property in question was subject to an easement
that created a private road running across it. The court suggested that
in the event of condemnation, nothing would have had to be paid to
the property owner. Unlike Poor, this case did not involve "double
taxation." The court observed that "[i]t is not shown that the property on both sides of this discontinued private road... has had added
to it the value of the easements therein. ' 28 In fact, the tenor of the
opinion suggested the opposite: that the dominant estate had virtually
no use for the private road. Nevertheless, there appeared to be little
doubt that the existence of the road completely destroyed any value
29
of the burdened property.
Despite such distinguishing factors, the court concluded that the
case came "squarely" within the reasoning of Poor. The opinion
ignored the overall change in the city's tax base and concentrated instead on the market value of the estate under consideration: "IT]he
27.

143 A.D. 389, 128 N.Y.S. 569, aff'd per curiam, 202 N.Y. 550, 95 N.E. 1137

(1911).
28. Id. at 393, 128 N.Y.S. at 572.
29. The court suggested that in the event of condemnation nothing would have
had to be paid to the property owner. Id.
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fact is that a piece of real estate which had been deprived of all its
valuable attributes, so far as the owner was concerned, was treated by
the tax commissioners as if still possessing them."8 0
Topping, then, seems to clarify Poor by indicating that only the
market value is relevant in these cases. Presumably, the "equitable"
factors in Poor were solely that-factors that made the decision easier,
but which were not vital to the outcome. Even under this interpretation, however, some of the nuances of the Topping opinion remain
unexplained. For example, the court was not totally willing to ignore
the assessments of properties other than the plaintiff's. Although it
felt that the plaintiff's property had lost its valuable attributes, the
court did not go quite so far as to say that those valuable attributes
had vanished into thin air, so to speak. To the contrary, Topping concluded that the land's "valuable qualities have been attached to the
adjoining properties which, by the acquisition of easements appurtenant thereto, have been increased in value and should be assessed accordingly." 3'
What can this observation really mean? As noted, the court was
quite clear in suggesting the easement was of no practical use to the
dominant estate. Presumably, then this factor did not matter: even
though the easement may be quite valuable, in the sense that the
owner of the servient estate might be willing to purchase it at a high
price, it should be taxed at the value it has to the owner of the dominant estate-however minimal that may be. Such a proposition would
be consistent with the fairly narrow market value test that the Topping court had set up in evaluating the servient estate, and moreover,
would conform with a not irrational theory of property taxation, the
goal of which would be to preserve not the value of taxable rights,
but merely the taxability of all possible rights. So long as the creation
of an easement transfers a right from one taxable entity to another,
there has been no "erosion" of the property tax base.
Alternatively, the court might have been suggesting something
more, namely, that the easement rights did have an independent value,
and that they should be taxed at that value to whomever owns them.
This interpretation would be the more practical since preserving the
taxability of rights would be pointless when the values of those rights
can totally disappear as the result of transfers. Attaching a minimum
value to the easement interest at least preserves something important
30. Id.
31. Id. at 394, 128 N.Y.S. at 573.
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to "the taxing jurisdiction. This type of system, however, implicitly
takes the incorrect approach of treating the easement as a fictional
physical entity, with a value of its own. Furthermore, it is untrue to
the market value principle espoused by the court. If it is inequitable
to tax the servient estate on rights it does not possess, is it not equally
inequitable to tax the dominant estate on a market value that bears
no real relation to the rights it does possess?
Although Topping and Poor raise numerous questions, the subsequent opinions have consistently refused to answer them. In part
this is because the cases in which these questions arose usually involved challenges to the assessments of servient estates only.3 2 Courts in
such cases could easily ignore the taxation of the dominant estate and
concentrate instead on doing justice to the owners of burdened tenements. Treating an easement as a physical entity, something "carved
out," ensured that it would eventually show up and be taxed to someone. Indeed, the language from Poor and Topping became almost a
litany that was parroted by each succeeding court.
A 1914 New York Court of Appeals case, Tax Lien Company v.
Schultze,8 3 clearly illustrates this phenomenon. The case was not really
about the assessment of easements, but rather the effect of a tax lien
upon them. The question addressed was whether the tax sale of the
servient estate would destroy the existence of the easement upon it.
The court felt compelled to examine first the general treatment of
easements for property tax purposes: "When an easement is carved out
of one property for the benefit of another, the market value of the
servient estate is thereby lessened, and that of the dominant increased,
practically by just the value of the easement; the respective tenements
should therefore be assessed accordingly."8 4 This is virtually identical
to the plaintiffs' contention in Poor.25 Here, the court has treated it
not merely as a suggestive guide to a just outcome, however, but
rather as a statement of the law itself. In doing so, it has explicitly
suggested (even concluded, one might fairly say) that an easement
has a single value, and that this value is transferred from servient to
dominant estate. Unfortunately, the court did not have to apply this
proposition to the owner of the dominant estate, or it might have discovered the complexities discussed above.
32. Bonbright had noted in 1937 that there was extremely little law on how an
easement was to be valued. 1 .T. BONBRIGHT, supra note 17, at 497 n.103. That comment is equally true today.
33. 213 N.Y. 9, 106 N.E. 751 (1914).
34. Id. at 11, 106 N.E. at 752.
35. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
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Indeed, for its purposes, all that the court needed was to be able
to demonstrate that whatever its value, the easement was not being
taxed to the owner of the servient estate. If nothing else, this issue
was resolved in Topping. Thus, since the easement was not an element
of the unpaid tax liability of the servient estate, the Schultze court
concluded that it was not destroyed on a tax sale of that estate. 0 This
came as "a necessary consequence" of the fact that easements were
taxed to the dominant estate.
Easement taxation was next discussed in Crane Berkley Corporation v. Lavis,3T where a developer was taxed on the value of a park
that he had been required to create in order to obtain approval of
his development plan. He resisted the assessment, claiming that he no
longer had any interest in the "value" of the park land. Since the park
was for the benefit of homeowners in the development, he argued the
value of the park had been attached to those homes.
Interestingly, the tax assessors had not assessed the value of the
park to the surrounding homes. Thus, as in Topping, there was no
question of double taxation. Presumably the jurisdiction simply
wanted to employ a method of assessment that avoided needless complexity. Only one taxpayer would have to be billed, and there would
be no need to allocate the park's value among the individual landowners. Indeed, it might be expected that the assessment of the park
land to its owner would lead to the eventual reallocation of the tax
burden among the homeowners. Even if the developer in this particular instance were unable to so distribute the tax burden, future
developers would certainly be able to include in their plans appropriate contractual provisions, similar to those used for allocating tax liability between lessors and lessees.38
As might be expected from the prior case law, the court concluded that the assessor did not have the option of deciding whom to
assess; the land could be assessed only to the homeowners. 0 This result was mandated even though there was no actual easement belonging to the homeowners. The court found it sufficient that the structure
of the development established a situation "equivalent" to the creation of an easement. The result was
to destroy, and as a fact it has destroyed, the taxable value of the
36. 213 N.Y.
37. 238 A.D.
38. See, e.g.,
(en banc).
39. 238 A.D.

at 12, 106 N.E. at 752.
124, 263 N.Y.S. 556 (1933).
Olark-Kunzl Co. v. Williams, 78 Wash. 2d 59, 469 P.2d 874 (1970)
at 127, 263 N.Y.S. at 560.
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park lands in the owner of the fee of those lands, or it may be, stating it better, it has shifted the taxable value from the park lands to
the other lands of the development, to the owners of which the use
and enjoyment of the park lands for park purposes for all time is
assured ....- 40
The opinion is unclear as to how this result will affect the tax base
of the community. The above language does suggest, however, that
the court felt there would be little, if any, revenue loss. 4 1 In this sense,
then, Crane Berkley is a much easier case than Topping was, for it
did not require the court to apply a rule whose application would
lead to a decrease in the tax base.
One of the more thorough discussions of this subject appeared
twenty years later in Beach Bungalows v. Bushwick Savings Bank,42 a
decision by a New York trial court. As in Schultze, the major issue in
the case was whether a pre-existing easement could survive a tax lien.
In reaching that issue, the court made its own determination of why
the rules as to easements existed, apparently relying on pure "market
value" considerations:
Upon the creation of (an appurtenant) easement the dominant tenement experiences an enhancement in value for sale purposes by reason of the existence of the easement. When the land constituting the
dominant tenement is sold . . . the purchaser gets the benefit of the
easement. It follows that the value of the land for sale purposes, and
hence for tax purposes, is enhanced because of the existence of the
easement.... This interest having been taxed to the owner of the
dominant tenement, the value of this interest ought not to be taxed
43
again to the owner of the servient tenement.

The argument made here that taxable value is equivalent to the sales
price is curious, since the general treatment of split interests in New
York is contrary to the market value assessment rule: a buyer will pay
less for property as a result of the existence of lessees, mortgagees, and
remainder interests, and yet none of these is deemed to affect the value

of the interest for property tax purposes. 44 The court in Beach Bungalows failed to explain the reason for distinguishing easements from
40. Id.

41. The court's implicit test, of course, was whether the taxing jurisdiction would
recoup the taxable value of the park land. This ignores the fact that the jurisdiction
has also lost the tax on future improvements on the property.
42. 133 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 285 A.D. 1069 141 N.Y.S.2d 503
(1955).
43. Id. at 716.
44. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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other similar interests. Moreover, had it not considered the easement
interest as belonging to the dominant estate for tax purposes, the double taxation problem about which it worried would have vanished.
Finally, in the 1962 case of People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Commission,4 5 the Appellate Division attempted to justify the rule of Poor
and Topping. After again repeating the by-then-standard litany about
the value of the easement being transferred to the dominant estate,
the court stated:
This method of assessment, where there are easement interests, is
fully in accord with the purpose and policy of the tax laws to subject
real property to taxation upon its full value. The easement interest
is thereby viewed in a proper perspective to achieve full and proper
valuation for assessment purposes. This method is clearly justified on
the basis that it places the easement where it belongs for tax lien
and tax sale purposes, namely, severed from the servient estate and
attached to the dominant estate.46
Although the Gale court properly emphasized the need for "full
value" taxation, a goal which has in fact been strongly supported by
the New York case law, 47 nothing in the opinion indicates how the
court's rule will aid in achieving that goal. In fact, the opposite will
probably occur because values change as property interests are transferred among owners. Thus, this rule more likely hinders the taxation
of the "full value." Even if that were not the case, however, it should
at least be recognized that "full value" is a concept that is ambiguous
at best. Until that concept is more precisely defined no clear answer
to the easement problem can be obtained.
Given its ringing defense of the concept of full value taxation,
the Gale court may be forgiven its misapplication of that concept. It
cannot be forgiven, however, for its mystifying comment on the relationship between the taxation of easements and the tax sale rule,
quoted above. It was in 1914, in Schultze, that the tax sale rule first
emerged. As noted, the court developed the rule as a result of the
existing treatment of easements for tax purposes. 48 Thus, it is certainly odd to find the Gale court reversing the process and supporting
the easement tax rule because it is in conformity with the tax sale
rule.49 A neat trick indeed.
45. 17 A.D.2d 225, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1962).

46. Id. at 228 n.*, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 505 n.* .
47. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland, 16 A.D.2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d
982 (1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1044, 190 N.E.2d 239, 239 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1963).
48. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
49. It is, of course, open to argument whether the proper place for the easement
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III.

TAXATION OF RESTRICTED-USE PROPERTY

The preceding section examined the existing tax treatment of
easement interests in an effort to illustrate some of the considerations
that are relevant to the taxation of property subject to private restrictions. The goal of this section is to organize those considerations
into a coherent framework, and then to develop fairly specific rules
for taxing restricted-use property. The approach taken here leads ultimately to a suggested definition of ownership for property tax purposes, that is, a formula for determining which person, in relation to
the special needs of the property tax system, is to be considered the
owner of a particular property right. In developing this formula, burdened and benefitted properties are treated as analytically distinguishable.
A landowner who makes an enforceable restrictive-use agreement
for the benefit of his neighbor reduces the scope of property rights he
can exercise with respect to his own land; this reduction in rights will
probably also diminish the market value of his property. Nevertheless, an argument can be made for taxing the transferred rights as if
they still belonged to the original owner. As shall be shown, any other
system would be contrary to basic themes of property taxation.
A. Full Value Taxation
Since the measuring rod for the property tax is ultimately not
property alone, but rather the value of property, it is appropriate to
begin this investigation with an examination of the concept of value.
There is certainly a great deal of diversity in the terminologies used
by taxing jurisdictions for the purpose of defining exactly what value
it is that they are seeking to tax. Given the various formulationsin a tax sale is with the dominant or servient estate; and, if the easement is deemed
to be attached to the dominant estate, it would not be irrational to apply a similar rule
then for taxation purposes. That decision would require a determination that uniformity
between the two rules is of greater importance than whatever other concerns might
militate toward attaching the easement to the servient estate for taxation purposes.
In any event, the argument presupposes some justification for treating the easement as part of the dominant estate for tax sale purposes. One possible reason was
given in Jackson v. Smith, 153 A.D. 724, 138 N.Y.S. 654 (1912), where the court felt
it would be unfair for the easement owner to have to protect his interest by paying
taxes not just on the increase in value of his own estate, but also on the servient estate's
value. This argument, however, is of no force if the dominant estate is not taxed on the
easement interest, and thus assumes away its conclusion. In reality, the position of the
dominant estate owner is no worse than that of a lessee.
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"fair and reasonable market value," 50 "full cash value,"' "true market
value," 2 "present true and actual value,"5 3 and so forth-one wonders
whether the differences in phraseology actually correspond to differences in the substantive legal standards to be applied. At the least, it
is clear that this array of statutes, all disdaining the taxation of mere
"value," must reflect some basic undercurrent common to property
taxation generally. Surely qualifiers such as "true," "full," and "actual" are directed toward some special concept of value for property
tax purposes.
At the outset, one observation can be made about these sundry
qualifiers: they serve to objectify the standard of value that is to be
applied.5 4 The great majority of the value standards appear to seek
ultimately an ideal market value, meaning the price at which a willing buyer would buy from a willing seller in an open market. 5 The
need for an objective standard of this nature should be self-evident.
Just as in the realm of income taxation it would be administratively
impractical to tax imputed income, so it would be equally if not more
impractical to tax property owners on the personal satisfaction they get
from owning property.
The need for objectivity, however, does not fully justify assessing
property for tax purposes at its ideal market value. Presumably an
objective measure of real value to the owner would not be much more
difficult to determine than a hypothetical "ideal" value. Moreover, the
property tax is essentially a wealth tax and, while there is no single
theoretical foundation for it, one frequent justification is that it is
grounded to some degree on the owner's ability to pay, as measured
by the property that is subject to the tax.50 Faithful adherence to a
doctrine that a property owner should be taxed according to his ability to pay would require that taxation be based on an objective meas50. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 46 (1958).
51. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 42-221 (West Supp. 1975-1976).

52.
53.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-428
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

(1960).
12-63 (1958).

54. See, e.g., De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290
P.2d 544 (1955).
55. See, e.g., 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE
138-39 (1974).
56. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
344-46 (2d ed. 1976). Ability to pay is a criterion that reflects considerations of
equity. These were probably foremost in the minds of the New York judges when they
emphasized a market value standard in reducing the taxable value of the plaintiffs'
property in the easement cases. See text accompanying notes 16-49 supra.
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ure of the value of the property to its current owner, not of its value
to a willing buyer.57
Nevertheless, most statutes and court decisions provide for assessment at the "ideal" market value. Thus, restrictions "personal" to the
owner of real property are ignored for valuation purposes. For example, in Knickerbocker Village, Inc. v. Boyland,58 the court considered
the problem of assessing a housing project that was subject to a number of statutory provisions restricting its saleability. Since the restrictions were clear and indisputably binding,5 9 there was no difficulty in
measuring the resale value of the property to its current owner, which
was significantly below what a willing buyer would have paid. Nonetheless, the court concluded that they were personal to the current
owner.60 As a result, the project was valued as if it were unrestricted,
a proposition clearly contrary to the actual legal state of affairs.
A somewhat different case illustrating a similar principle is
R.L.K. & Co. v. State Tax Commission,1 where the taxpayer possessed
a "use permit" which gave him essentially unlimited use of certain
government-owned land for fifteen years, after which the land would
revert to the government. The taxpayer claimed, and the lower court
agreed,.that his interest would be decreasing in value over the 15 years,
and that he should be taxed accordingly. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that the decreasing payment schedule did
reflect the true market value of the interest, but held that he was
nevertheless taxable on the full value of the fee simple. The court explicitly noted that no constitutional violation occurred as a result. In
essence, then, the taxpayer was deemed to be the owner of the government's remainder interest, which thus became taxable to him. While
this result might be described as unwise, it nevertheless is a remarkable demonstration of the extent to which a taxpayer can be taxed according to a value he never sees.
57. Otherwise, many owners would be required to sell their property or change its
use. For example, the expanding borders of many cities produce skyrocketing values for
neighboring farmland. The resulting increases in property taxes can make farming unprofitable and force farmers to sell their land to developers. See text accompanying
notes 113-115 infra.
58. 16 A.D.2d 223, 226 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 1044, 190 N.E.2d
239, 239 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1963).
59. This case is thus distinguishable from those wherein the decrease in value is
the result of poor business judgment on the part of the taxpayer. See, e.g., Clayton v.
County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. App. 3d 390, 102 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1972); Lodge v.
Swampscott, 216 Mass. 260, 103 N.B. 635 (1913).
60. 16 A.D.2d at 228, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
61. 249 Ore. 603, 438 P.2d 985 (1968).
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The true nature of taxable market value is a frequent question
in cases involving unfavorable leases. The law on this issue differs
greatly among various jurisdictions. Of those states which will take
into account the existence of an unfavorable lease in valuing property, Michigan has the most explicit case law. In C.A.F. Investment
Co. v. Michigan State Tax Commission,62 for example, the Michigan
Supreme Court had to construe a statute using the term "economic
income." The court stated:
[T]he taxing authorities have contended that [economic income] creates a new concept of taking into account hypothetical income which
is different than the actual income from the property... . They thus
in effect define "economic income" as the possible income absent a
lease, rather than the actual income in the face of a pre-existing
63
lease.

The court rejected the arguments of the taxing authorities and held
that "economic income" means actual income. 4 This holding is in
fact consistent with earlier Michigan cases that had interpreted the
statute prior to the introduction of the phrase "economic income."
For example, in Lochmoor Club v. City of Grosse Point Woods,65
which involved a private park, a lower court rejected the State Tax
Commission's argument that the restrictive covenant at issue did not
warrant a reduction in assessment. The court concluded that "[t]o
ignore such a restriction constitutes fraud on the taxpayer ....",,0
Other jurisdictions, no doubt marching to the beat of a very different drummer, have had little trouble ignoring the circumstances of
a particular owner. Consider the language in De Luz Homes, Inc. v.
County of San Diego,6 7 a 1955 en banc decision of the California Supreme Court:
The present owner may have invested well or poorly, may have contracted to pay very high or very low rent, and may have built very
expensive improvements or none at all. . . .[S]ince, however, the
legislative standard is "full cash value," it is clear that whatever
may be the rationale of the property tax, it is not the profitableness
of the property to the present owner.6s
62. 392 Mich. 442, 221 N.W.2d 588 (1974).
63. Id. at 454 n.3, 221 N.W.2d at 594 n.3 (quoting MICHICAN LAw
COMISSION, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT).
64. Id. at 454, 221 N.W.2d at 594.
65. 10 Mich. App. 394, 159 N.W.2d 756 (1968).
66. Id. at 398, 159 N.W.2d at 758.
67. 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
68. Id. at 566, 290 P.2d at 557.
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Oregon takes a similar view of the goals of the property tax system.
In Swan Lake Moulding Co. v. Departmentof Revenue, 9 the land at
issue was subject to leases running for over 30 years. The court analyzed the issue in this manner:
The appraisers testifying for the taxpayer stated that these leases had
to be taken into account as they control the income potential and
what the highest and best possible use would be if the land were unencumbered is only hypothetical.... In fixing the true cash value of

land for property tax purposes the effect of existing leases on the
value to the owner is disregarded. The basis for such a principle is
that the tax is levied upon the land and is a tax upon all interests
into which the land might be divided. Admittedly, a lease might decrease the price which the owner might receive; however, the tax is
not merely upon the owner's interest; the tax is upon all the interests in the land, including the leasehold interest. 0
The comments in the Swan Lake opinion with regard to taxing
all of the interests are particularly interesting. The court suggests that
ignoring the lease is required because otherwise a property interest
will not be taxed. Yet the court is clearly wrong in this conclusion.
The taxpayer was not claiming that he could not be taxed on the
stream of payments he was receiving from the lessee. This stream,
therefore, would have represented one possible method of taxing the
lease interest. Thus, the real dispute was not whether the lease resulted in a property right becoming tax-exempt; rather, it was whether
the lease altered the value of that property right. The court's decision
is therefore one in support not merely of preserving the taxability of
all property rights, but also of preserving the value of those rights for
tax purposes. The distinction is a crucial one, and bears directly upon
the proper taxation of the easement.
A word should also be said about the notion of "best use" mentioned in Swan Lake. The argument that property rights should be
valued as if they were applied to their best use stems directly from
the concept of ideal market value. Presumably, a buyer who wanted
to use the property for its best use would pay more than anyone else,
and thus the seller would sell to him. This aspect of the valuation rule
is a further reflection of the extent to which the tax system strives for
some ideal value to tax. In addition, since it applies even to unrestricted property, the best use concept is extremely potent. For ex69. 257 Ore. 622, 478 P.2d 393 (1970).
70. Id. at 625, 478 P.2d at 395.
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ample, in Sabin v. Department of Revenue,71 the Oregon Supreme
Court approved an assessment based upon a non-existing division of
the property into sub-units:
The principal contention is that the subject property should have
been assessed as one piece, and therefore it was erroneous to value
the property on the basis of a hypothetical division of the property
into smaller units. We find no error....

There is no reason why a

large parcel should not be hypothetically subdivided for the purpose
of assessment when the evidence indicates, as it does here, that such
subdivision is required to effectuate the highest and best use of the
property.72
As a number of the cases discussed above have indicated, it is not
easy to establish exactly where the "full value" concept comes from.
As noted earlier, it is not mandated by the needs of efficient administration. Moreover, it exists in spite of being in direct conflict with
principles of equitable taxation. Most likely its source is simply the
need for the taxing jurisdiction to maintain its major source of revenue. While the power to tax may be the power to destroy, it is equally
true that the absence of taxing power would put an end to many local
governments.7 3 Moving from this basic premise to the rule of "full
71. 270 Ore. 422, 528 P.2d 69 (1974).
72. Id. at 425-26, 528 P.2d at 70-71.
73. A striking example of how little concern is often shown for local tax bases is
given by Bensalem Township School Dist. v. County Comm'rs, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 411,
303 A.2d 258 (1973). In that case, a state statute was passed allowing counties to
contract with landowners to have their land preserved as open-space land, with the
result that property taxes would be lowered in accordance with this restricted use. A
school district then brought suit, claiming that the statute unconstitutionally deprived
it of its tax base by requiring the valuation of property at something other than the
full value demanded by the state constitution. The court rather summarily rejected these
claims:
Act 515 merely provides that a county may covenant that a tax assessment will
reflect the fair market value of the land as restricted by the covenant. No cxemptions from taxation are awarded. It is merely agreed to recognize the actual
value of the land as its use has been restricted. Land must be assessed according
to its actual value, and actual value means market value .... As courts in the
past have recognized, especially in eminent domain cases, everything which
affects the value of the land is a proper element [of valuation] .... [I]n arriving at market value, it is proper to consider any restrictions placed on the land.
Id. at 417, 303 A.2d at 262-63 (footnote omitted).
As the analysis in the body of this paper attempts to demonstrate, a municipality
need not respect private restrictive covenants; to force it to do so would destroy the
protection given its tax base by the full value principle. In the facts of this case, of
course, the restrictions are not wholly private; and, in most circumstances, it is quite
appropriate that a restriction enacted at the express consent of the government should
be recognized for valuation purposes. The unique factor in this case is that two governmental bodies are disagreeing on the extent to which the restrictions should be
recognized-and it is the unit which relies on the tax revenue which is unwilling to

19781

PROPERTY TAX

value" taxation requires no great leap. To the extent that private actions are allowed to decrease the tax base below a certain fixed minimum, an undesirable element of uncertainty enters the system. Taxpayers could easily take advantage of this uncertainty to create arrangements leading to the reduction of their property taxes.7 4
The "full value" rule stands as an inviolable wall preventing any
such intrusions upon the tax base. Its force lies not so much in that
it guarantees a particular tax base, but rather that it acts as an obstacle
to a variety of arrangements that would otherwise wreak havoc with
the system. The concept of "full value" thus can be understood less
as a substantive theory regarding the proper definition of value than
as a corollary of the following principle: no private action should be
permitted to reduce the taxable base of any particular property below
a fixed minimum.
B. The Fee Simple Bundle
[T1]o achieve the essential indiscriminate and full measure of taxation of real property as a whole, it is not generally proper or necessary that separate legal interests in a piece of property be independently assessedY5

The preceding section has provided only a partial answer to the
problem of taxing restricted property. Assuming that a "full value"
standard requires that certain types of private agreements restricting
the use of property be ignored for valuation purposes, it remains to
accept the restriction. Certainly, forcing it to accept the restriction for valuation purposes might cause serious revenue consequences. The question of who "wins out" in this
instance is a complex one, and no doubt must be answered by resort to the provisions
of the state 'constitution detailing the respective powers of the two governmental units.
The court's answer-that the restriction is enforceable, and thus prima facie affects
assessed value-is wholly inadequate.
74. This possibility is examined and rejected in Arizona R.C.I.A. Lands, Inc. v.
Ainsworth, 21 Ariz. App. 38, 515 P.2d 335 (1973), where the court held that easement
interests did affect the taxable value of property:

Plaintiff argues that if the Superior Court decision is upheld it would have a
statewide detrimental effect upon tax revenues by creating a perfectly valid
means of escape from real property taxes. The authorities cited above indicate,
however, that the holder of an easement ... is presumed to have paid a tax on
the value of the easement inasmuch as that value was added to the value of
the easement holder's dominant estate for tax assessment purposes. Thus, the

easement holder is not escaping taxation on the value of the easement, but
rather is paying a full tax on that value.
Id. at 41, 515 P.2d at 339. The court has made the error of assuming the easement,
like a physical entity, has a "value" which is transferred from one property to another. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
75. People ex rel. Gale v. Tax Comm'n, 17 A.D.2d 225, 228, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501,
504 (1962).
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be determined what constitutes an agreement conflicting with the full
value standard. It is not always self-evident that a particular arrangement has led to a restriction on the use of property rights. An affirmative easement, for example, may be viewed either as restricting the
rights of the owner of the servient estate, or as having merely transferred those rights to the owner of the dominant estate. If it is viewed
as a mere transfer, and not as a restriction, then the easement need
not be ignored to achieve full value taxation. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the property tax system has in fact chosen
between these two alternatives.
In order to tax property at its full value, it is necessary to identify
,every property right. Given that an infinite number of such rights can
be imagined, it is unreasonable to expect any tax system to identify
and tax each of them separately. There must of necessity be a device
for categorizing these rights, for mapping them into a manageable
number of "clusters." To anyone familiar with property law, the fee
simple should immediately suggest itself as a likely candidate for this
role. Every property right is a part of some fee simple interest; moreover, it is a part of only one such fee simple. Consequently, using the
fee simple as the basic unit for categorizing rights would produce a
complete and non-duplicative structure. More important, since the fee
simple is the most complete set of rights that can be possessed with
respect to a piece of real property,76 its choice as a basic unit for assessment would minimize the number of necessary separate assessments, a result of no small importance given the possible administrative concerns.
It is therefore not surprising to find considerable support for the
use of the fee simple as a fundamental unit in the property tax area.
As stated by Professor Bonbright:
Real estate is commonly split up into separate legal interests held by
different persons-mortgagor and mortgagee, landlord, tenant, and
subtenant, holders of various easements over the land, and so forth.
76. The fee simple interest has been described thusly:
It is elementary that a property interest is one or more of the rights, powers,
privileges and immunities over and concerning land Which exist in a particular
person. The totality of these rights, powers, privileges and immunities which it
is legally possible for an owner to have with regard to a given piece of land
constitutes complete property in the land. Land thus owned is held in fee
simple, which is the largest estate known to the law and which constitutes ownership in the fullest sense in, since complete dominion, possession and enjoyment
are in the owner.
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (emphasis added).
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Here, too, one would think, an allocation problem is presented; for
if these legal interests are regarded as so many separate properties,
must not the unitary value of the physically undivided land be apportioned among them? Contrary to expectation, the answer is that
the general property tax ordinarily pays no attention to these divisions of77 interest and assesses the property as if it were owned in fee
simple.
Despite his feeling that this result is an odd one, Bonbright nevertheless finds a simple explanation. Observing that it is "immaterial"
whether the result is explainable on "historical or on other grounds,"
he concludes that it "can be justified practically on the ground that
the number of assessments is reduced to a fraction of what they would
otherwise be, and also that difficult problems of allocation of values
78
are avoided."
The use of the fee simple unit in property taxation dates at least
as far back as 1906. In Hill v. Williams,79 the Maryland Court of Appeals approved the assessors' decision to ignore a restrictive easement
in valuing an estate:
As the fee-simple title remained in the ...

estate, the land was prop-

erly assessed to that estate. It was no part of the duty of the appeal
tax court to inquire into or separately value the interest or easement
And there is nothing in our general tax system which compels
....
the collector to examine what title a party has to land with which
he is assessed ....

It is not compatible with public convenience and

the prompt collection of revenue for the state to trace out all the
subdivided or qualified interests that may be held in real estate and
seek to hold various owners responsible. Its policy is to assess the
fee-simple value of the land to the holder of the possession.80
Several years later, in one of its rare comments on the property tax,
the United States Supreme Court stated simply: "In ordinary cases
the whole property is taxed and which party shall bear the burden is
not a matter of public concern." 8 '
A review of the case law and commentary on this point reveals
two separate themes that justify the use of the fee simple. One of
these, as noted earlier, is administrative convenience.8 2 But surely, con77. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 17, at 495-96.
78. Id. at 497.
79. 104 Md. 595, 65 A. 413 (1906).
80. Id. at 603, 65 A. at 414.
81. Trimble v. Seattle, 231 U.S. 683, 689 (1914).
82. See text accompanying note 76 supra. See also Doughty v. Loomis, 9 A.D.2d
574, 575, 189 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 722, 167 N.E.2d 643, 201
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venience alone could not support the taxation of interests to people
who no longer own them. Indeed, it would not be difficult to establish
a system whereby owners of property interests could petition for special assessments at their own expense; these special assessments could
serve to verify the splitting of the fee simple interest among a number of owners.8 3 The owner of the fee simple would remain primarily
liable, but the assessing jurisdiction would initially attempt to collect
the appropriate share of the taxes from the holders of the sub-interests. Such a system is not very complicated and has been proposed by
at least one opponent of the existing system. 4 It would constitute a
definite move toward greater equity in the property tax, a goal that
5
should be fundamental to the design of any type of tax.8
Given the possible benefits, it may appear somewhat surprising
that no such special systems for assessing split interests have yet been
enacted. The surprise vanishes, however, when one recognizes that
there is a second justification for the use of the fee simple for tax
purposes: it is a key factor in assuring full value taxation. 0 Specifically, the fee simple unit provides a generally applicable standard by
which "full value" can be determined. In a world free of transaction
costs, such a standard would not be needed. As suggested by the Coase
Theorem, property rights could be valued on the assumption that they
N.Y.S.2d 100 (1960)

("No requirement of any statute compels the assessor to trace

and follow internal arrangements between lessors and lessees as to who should pay the
tax; and it would be an unfair burden to make them do this.").
83. Such a system would be somewhat similar to what is done under the special
schemes used for the reduction of assessments on open-space property. See, e.g., Mix,
Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can it Fulfill its Objectives?, 11 SANTA
CLARA LAW.

259 (1971).

84. See Nichols, supra note 4.
85. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSORAVE, supra note 56, at 210.
86. The language of courts and commentators suggests that the fee simple plays
a role in the preservation of value. See, e.g., Hill v. Williams, 104 Md. 595, 596, 65
A. 413, 414 (1906) (the goal is to assess the "fee-simple value"); People ex rel. Gale
v. Tax Comm'n, 17 A.D.2d 225, 228, 233 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (1962) (one value is
assigned to property in order to achieve the "essential indiscriminate and full measure
.. . of real property as a whole") ; I J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 17, at 495 (there is a
"unitary value of the physically undivided land").
In addition, consider the following comments:
[T]he dominant theme of the real property tax statutes remains unitary assessment-assigning one value and computing one tax. No matter how the ownership of the property is broken down in fact, the values of all separate elements
are distilled into a single figure. Separate consideration of individual interests
is given only to the extent required in valuing the whole....
Viewing each piece of property as a unified whole, lumping together all
interests for valuation purposes, and emphasizing the payment of the full tax
results in the frequently adopted approach of giving highly particularized
statutory directions as to which of several interests is to bear the entire tax.
Nichols, supra note 4, at 309 (footnotes omitted).
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were being employed in the most efficient arrangement possible8 7
Transaction costs exist, however, and the allocation of property rights
affects their values. As was shown earlier, for example, the transfer of
an easement interest to a dominant estate will not necessarily create
equal changes in value on both sides of the transaction.ss Thus, in a
system that seeks to preserve a minimum value for all rights, it is extremely important to develop a consistent and meaningful valuation
standard.
The fee simple, as a compartment containing the full set of rights
connected with a particular piece of property, provides a meaningful
standard.8 9 Although achieving the most efficient use of property sometimes requires going beyond the borders of a particular parcel and
acquiring additional rights, in most circumstances, the fee simple allows its owner to make full use of his property without acquiring such
"external" rights-or incurring any additional transaction costs. Thus,
in general, grouping all the rights into a single fee simple bundle for
the purposes of taxation is likely to lead to their most efficient use,
and, concomitantly, the greatest valuation of those rights. Given the
need for administrative convenience in taxation, it is then surely reasonable for the property tax system to value all property as if it were
owned in fee simple.
C. A Rule of Ownership
Now that the parallel concepts of full value taxation and fee simple categorization have been developed, the resulting valuation rule
can be stated:
Every property right should be valued as a part of the fee simple
interest of which it is properly a part. The owner of that fee simple
should be taxed according to the value of all rights that are a part of
the fee simple, whether or not he possesses all such rights.
87. See Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & Ecox. 1 (1960). Coase
argued that in a completely unrestricted market, property would eventually be used in
the most efficient manner possible. To illustrate this conclusion, imagine that farmer
A's property adjoins that of B, who raises livestock. B's animals often escape and
destroy portions of A's crops. One can imagine two alternative initial allocations of
rights in this situation: A may be given an absolute right to prevent his neighbors
from raising livestock, or B may be given an absolute right to raise as many animals as
he desires. Coase demonstrated that, as long as A and B can come together and resolve
their conflicting rights in a costless manner, it does not matter which initial allocation
of rights is chosen. In both instances, the negotiations between A and B will ultimately
result in the outcome that maximizes overall efficiency. See generally R. POSNER, EcoNOMtIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 16-17 (1972).
88. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
89. See note 76 supra.
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Under the proposed valuation system, the fee simple owner is presumed to own all property rights that are a part of the fee simple.
Of course, he will often not really own every such right; the interests
of lessees, remaindermen, and owners of easements, to name but a few,
will restrict his use of the land. Nonetheless, in order to satisfy the
needs of the property tax system, the fee simple owner will be taxed
on the value of these rights.
An example of how this rule might apply in practice is appropriate at this stage. In Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King
County,90 the assessment of a privately owned golf course was at issue.
The golf course was part of a planned unit development; it had been
intended from the start to be an integral part of the newly created
housing arrangement. After completion of the development, the developer conveyed the golf course land to a corporation entrusted with
its operation. To each of the homeowners in the new development,
he gave the right to ensure that the land be maintained as a golf
course for a twenty-year period. Furthermore, this restriction was to
be automatically renewed. for ten-year periods unless seventy-five per
cent of the owners requested otherwise.91
Even though it attempted to attract players from beyond the
group of homeowners, the golf course consistently lost money. Despite
those losses, however, the county assessor valued the land at 660,000,
which was its market value without the restriction. The fee owner resisted this assessment, arguing that the land was restricted to use as a
golf course and that the golf course as operated was losing money.
Furthermore, he argued, the taxable value of homes in the development had increased by $1,141,108 as a result of their proximity to the
golf course, producing, in effect, a net gain of at least $481,108 to the
2
total taxable value of the development.
In the face of these arguments, it is not surprising that the Washington Supreme Court decided in favor of the golf course owner. It
concluded that where "the use of land is so restricted that its ownership is of no benefit or value, the assessment for tax purposes should
be nothing." By "failing to take into account the restrictions," the assessor had so overvalued the property as to produce a "constructive
93
fraud" on the owner.
90. 87 Wash. 2d 1, 548 P.2d 538 (1976).
91. Id. at 3, 548 P.2d at 539.
92. Brief for Respondent at 22, Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King County,
87 Wash. 2d 1, 548 P.2d 538 (1976).
93. 87 Wash. 2d at 5, 548 P.2d at 540.
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The court's conclusion was of course incorrect; the property
should have been valued in its unrestricted state. As this article has
attempted to prove, the argument that the county had lost nothing
from its tax base is a fallacious one. The proper value from which to
measure the loss to the tax base is not the $660,000 undeveloped value
of the golf course land, but rather the likely value of that land in its
developed state, with improvements included. Presumably, had the
land not been restricted, homes would have been built on it, and the
value of these homes would easily have been in the millions of dollars. As a result, the restrictive agreement created not a tax benefit of
$481,108, but rather a decrease in the tax base on the order of over
a million dollars.
Assessing the land as if it were unrestricted creates no "fraud"
upon the taxpayer, any more than does assessing the fee owner on
land subject to an unfavorable lease. In both instances, the fee owner
has voluntarily come into possession of property that should properly
produce a minimum amount of taxable value. Owners should be perfectly free to participate in arrangements which alter the value of
their rights, but should not be entitled to deprive the taxing jurisdiction of some share of its proper tax base. Failure to assess property
as if unrestricted ultimately results in a loss to the taxing jurisdiction.
Under existing valuation rules, restrictions on property will result in
reduced assessments only when those restrictions significantly reduce
the value of the property. Concomitantly, a restriction will significantly
reduce the value of property only when it prevents the property from
being put to its best use, which in most cases would involve development. As a result, in virtually all important cases involving restrictive
agreements, the taxing jurisdiction, if it accepts a reduced assessment,
will be foregoing a sizable amount of tax on development that will
never take place. 4 Nothing in the system of property taxation mandates that a jurisdiction be forced to recognize private agreements that
virtually ensure reductions in its base.95
94. Another example of this phenomenon, apart from the planned unit development, is the effort to give farmers property tax relief so as to assure that farmland does

not quickly succumb to pressures for development emanating from the cities. See, e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL Ass'N

OF ASSESSING

OFFICERS,

USE-VALUE

FARMLAND

ASSESSMENT

(1974).
95. On the other hand, it is equally true that nothing forces the jurisdiction to
ignore the restriction. As will be noted in the final section of this paper, legitimate
reasons may support a voluntary recognition of a restrictive agreement.
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IV. TAXATION OF BENEFITTED PROPERTY

The economic phenomenon that has occurred here is that of a
dominant estate absorbing the value of the servient estate. As a result, the value of the servient estate is being taxed in the dominant estate. 96
Each parcel must be valued in its own right, and it may often
turn out . . .that a servient estate gives substantial value while still

retaining value. In short, a parcel's value is fixed with reference to
its own characteristics and burdens, and is not automatically reduced
by whatever collateral benefit it may give to neighboring lots.07
Thus far, the discussion has centered on only half of the restricted use puzzle. Presumably, a restriction on one piece of property
will result in a benefit to another. 98 The appropriate tax consequences
to the owner of the benefitted property must now be examined.
The two quotations above, taken from the briefs of the parties
in the Twin Lakes case, are helpful in initially framing the issue to
be confronted. Both discuss primarily the subject of the previous section of this article-the proper tax treatment to be accorded a burdened property. In so doing, however, they of necessity make reference to the valuation of the dominant property, emphasizing that the
interaction of benefitted and burdened properties is a crucial factor
in establishing a coherent tax structure.
Indeed, the fact that the proper tax consequences for the restricted
property have been resolved is highly relevant here. If a jurisdiction
taxes the fee owner on all rights normally encompassed within the
fee simple, it cannot at the same time tax those rights to someone
else. Otherwise the jurisdiction would be guilty of "double taxation."'9
This leads to the initial rule relating to the taxation of benefitted
property: The owner of a benefitted property cannot be taxed on the
rights that are deemed, for purposes of satisfying the full value principle, to remain in the hands of the owner of the servient tenement.
96. Brief for Respondent at 22, Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King County,
87 Wash. 2d 1, 548 P.2d 538 (1976).
97. Brief for Appellant at 28-29, Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King
County, 87 Wash. 2d 1, 548 P.2d 538 (1976).
98. As noted earlier, the treatment of easements in gross is somewhat special. See
note 12 supra.
99. A similar rule is specifically provided for under the federal income tax, where
section 1311 allows for the correction of errors in cases involving the IRS' maintenance
of "an inconsistent position." I.R.C. § 1311. Moreover, that inconsistency can involve
consideration of the circumstances of persons other than the taxpayer himself. See, e.g.,
Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-1(b), Example 2 (1978) (wife allowed refund where income
assigned to her by husband is ultimately taxed to husband in later year).
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It is important to note that this rule does not require the assessing authority to ignore the existence of the restrictive agreement from
the point of view of the benefitted tenement. For while the owner of
that tenement cannot be taxed on rights he has acquired as a result
of the agreement, he is nevertheless taxable on the rights he has owned
all along; and, most importantly, it is quite possible that the existence
of the restrictive agreement has increased the value of these "old"
rights. The distinction being made here is a fine but vital one, and
was completely ignored in People ex rel. Poor v. O'Donnell,100 where
the court concluded that since the assessors had taxed the value of a
private park to the homes surrounding it, they could no longer tax
that value to the park owner.' 0 ' The Poor court made the mistake of
confusing "value," which is not a transferable entity, with "rights,"
which can be preserved when they are transferred.
That it is foolish to ignore an agreement's effect on the dominant
property is indicated by the Twin Lakes case. There, as a result of
the existence of the golf course, which itself was worth $660,000 in an
undeveloped but unrestricted state, surrounding homes increased in
value by $1,141,108. The proper taxable value of the golf course
should be its unrestricted value, $660,000. But if the result of assuming the golf course to be unrestricted would be that the benefitted
properties must be taxed as if no restrictive agreement benefitted
them, then the jurisdiction would be forced to forego an extra
$1,141,108 of taxable value. In that case none of the $480,000 increase in total value resulting from the creation of the easements would
be taxable. This loss to the tax base is above and beyond the foregone
taxes on any development of the golf course land which, but for the
restrictions, might have occurred.
This example demonstrates quite clearly that ignoring the agreement from the point of view of the benefitted property would be unwise. In terms of economic reality, parties usually enter into a restrictive agreement only when some benefit, sufficient to outweigh
transaction costs, is likely to be generated. The jurisdiction should be
able to tax that benefit, without at the same time defeating the principle that the burdened property should be taxed at its unrestricted
value.
The solution to this seeming paradox is suggested by observing
100. 139 A.D. 83, 124 N.Y.S. 36, aff'd. per curiam, 200 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E. 1129
(1910).
101. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
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that owners often use their properties in ways that affect the value of
the property of others, without actually involving any transfer of
rights. Such effects on the property of others are normally referred to
as externalities. One variety of externality is that which imposes
costs upon the public generally, such as a landowner's discharge of
pollutants. 10 2 Other types of externalities may affect a smaller segment of the general population. For example, a particular use of a
piece of property may be simply incompatible with neighboring uses.
Of course, not all externalities are negative. The private park in Poor
and the golf course in Twin Lakes are both examples of property
uses that generated highly desirable externalities.
Several branches of property law have evolved in response to
problems created by externalities. Zoning law, for example, allows
municipalities to categorize and thereby restrict the location of various externalities, in order to avoid the efficiency losses that might result from allowing owners complete freedom in the use of their properties. 0 3 Nuisance law is similar, although its general purpose is not
so much to restrict location as to eliminate certain externalities entirely.

104

Given the existence of externalities, the question naturally arises
as to how they are to be incorporated into the property tax valuation
process. Where a piece of property generates favorable externalities
which increase the values of neighboring properties, should it be
entitled to a reduction in its own taxable value as a result? Or should
the neighboring properties be taxed as if their value had not been
increased? Alternatively, where property owner A uses his land in
such a way as to lower the market value of B's property, should A's
tax assessment be increased as a result? Or should B's property be assessed as if A's interfering use did not exist? The answer to all of these
questions should be no; the reason lies in an understanding of how
property law deals with externalities.
In general, externalities are not "property" under the existing
legal system. The person "producing" a positive externality has no
property right allowing him to take advantage of the beneficial effects
generated. And in most cases, the landowner who finds himself sub102. See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 56, at 56-61; Mishan,
The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1

(1971).
103. See Heller, supra note 6.
104. See generally W. PROSSER,
ed. 1971).

HANDBOOK

ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 89 (4th
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jected to a negative externality has no right to terminate it.105 In both
instances, the changes in value take place via interactions "external"
to the property law. 106
The vigor of this concept is best indicated by the zeal with which
it is sometimes attacked. In a landmark article, Professor Joseph Sax
has attempted to develop a new framework for analyzing the law of

just compensation for takings of property. 10 7 His theory is that in
many instances where governmental regulation causes a reduction in
the value of a piece of property, part or all of that reduction may be
considered a direct result of externalities produced by other pieces of
property. 0 8 Irrespective of the conclusions that Professor Sax ulti105. For example, to the owner who wants to build a swimming pool on his property, his neighbor's refusal to cut down a tree so as to increase the available sunlight
would not be actionable. In some cases, however, zoning and nuisance law provide such
rights. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra. ,
106. The classic view of property rights would appear to suggest that externalities
cannot even exist: "[CGujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos," meaning,
"to whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths." Macht v.
Department of Assessment, 266 Md. 602, 604 n.1, 296 A.2d 162, 164 n.1 (1972). The
phrase suggests that a piece of property is surrounded by walls extending infinitely high
into the air and infinitely low into the crust of the earth, permanently and unalterably
separating the property from surrounding units.
107. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
108.
The inadequacy of the view- of property rights embodied in takings law
can be demonstrated by reference to governmental regulation of strip mining.
Assume that the government has prohibited all strip mining on land having a
slope of more than twenty degrees, because it has been determined that, given
present technology, mining on such lands exposes lower lying land, owned by
others, to ruinous erosion. Under present practice, the question posed by a
court would be whether the governmental regulation, however justified, so reduced the value of the restricted owner's land as to deprive it of all present
economic productivity. If the effect of prohibiting strip mining were to make the
mining land utterly worthless to the holder, who might own only coal mining
rights, most courts today would award compensation to him. From the limited
perspective of the mineral owner claimant, who asks that the general public
bear the cost of thus advancing the social welfare, such a result might seem
appropriate.
It is more accurate, however, to identify the problem in quite another way.
The mineral owner demands that the lower land serve to carry mining wastes
while the lower owner demands that the upper lands be preserved in such a
way as to protect his desired uses. Neither owner is merely using his own property, nor is either entitled a 'priori to have his demand met, for neither of the
conflicting uses is, in some theoretical sense, superior to the other. Traditional,
legal analysis has looked only to the effects of government action on the complainant's land, and has thus attended to only one fraction of the problem, for
the property interest in controversy is not simply the land circumscribed within
the boundaries of the mine owner's tract, but the totality of property the mine
owner is using, which includes the land owned by those lower down. Is there
any reason in theory why the lower owner ought not to be equally entitled to
recover from the government for failing to protect his property right to use
his land for residential purposes by prohibiting mining above him? Surely there
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mately draws regarding the proper measure of compensation to be
paid when governmental regulation decreases the value of a piece of
property, his analysis underscores a characteristic of the existing system, namely, that property law often refuses to take cognizance of
externalities. This refusal has obvious consequences for a system of
taxation of property rights; 0 9 specifically, it produces answers for the
questions posed at the start of this analysis.
Can a property owner seek a reduced assessment when the use of
his property increases the value of someone else's property? No, for
that increase in value is produced by an externality, which in itself
generates no property rights. Property tax is imposed on the owner's
property; in the absence of any effect on his property rights, there
should be no change in his assessment. This concept might profitably
be restated as a general proposition:
In valuing a real property interest for property tax purposes, the
effects of the owner's use on the value of other property interests
should be ignored. The assessment of any parcel should be independent of its effects on other parcels.
As for the second question, can the effect of an unactionable negative
externality be ignored in assessing a piece of property whose value is
affected by it? Again, the answer is clearly no. Since the property
owner has no right to terminate the externality, it would be unjust
for the tax system to treat him as if he did. Indeed, it might profitably
be said that the property tax must be consistent with the common
law notion that a parcel is surrounded by infinite walls. The property owner is taxed solely on his use of the rights within such walls,
although what happens outside the walls may have a substantial influence on the value of his rights. In a sense, each property is surrounded by what might best be described by the term "environment"
-the set of all other properties whose uses will influence it via externalities. Each and every property can therefore be valued only
when it is examined in the context of its existing "environment."
These concepts may now be applied to the taxation of benefitted
tenements. Easements are created precisely for the externalities they
is no theory of property rights that suggests that property owners should have
an advantage in conflict resolution merely because of superior physical position,
e.g., being located at the top of a hill.

Id. at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
109. One suggestion of this is Cooley's observation, over a half century ago, that
it is "generally made imperative that separate and distinct parcels of land be assessed
separately." COOLEY ON TAXATION § 1068 (4th ed. 1924).
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produce. In other words, the increase in value of the benefitted property is the result of an externality generated by the burdened property, and hence may be taxed even though the burdened property is
to be assessed as if it were unrestricted. No problem of double taxation exists, since the benefitted property is not being taxed on rights
that are assumed to remain in the restricted estate, but rather, on an
increase in value resulting from externalities produced by the use of
the restricted estate. An increased valuation of the benefitted estate
merely acknowledges a beneficial change in that estate's environment.
That the owner of the benefitted property paid for the easement
should not change the analysis. Assume that A and B own identical
homes bordering on the property of C. Consider the following two
possibilities:
1. C turns his property into a neighborhood park, giving A and B
the right to keep it as such.
2. A pays C to turn his property into a park solely for his own benefit; only A can enforce the agreement.
In the first example, it should be evident that A and B can be
taxed on the increase in the values of their properties as a result of
C's beneficence. There has been a change in the environment, which
has affected their properties. The situation is similar to what happens whenever a neighborhood is upgraded-all the properties in that
neighborhood generally increase in value. Indeed, to make the analogy
even more compelling, assume that the increases in value to A's and
B's properties result solely from aesthetic considerations and that
neither A nor B may use the park in any way.
In fact, a property bordering the park need not receive any
"rights" at all to increase in value; the mere existence of the park is
what matters. The second example clarifies this observation. That B
has no right to insist upon the park's existence affects the value of his
property only to the extent that A declines to exercise his right. Conversely, if it is virtually certain that A and his successors in interest
will insist upon the park's continued existence, the value of B's
property will increase as much as it did in the first example. In either
case, the benefit B's property receives is the result of an externality,
and clearly should be recognized in the valuation process.
But what of A in example 2? Should he be treated differently
from B because he paid for change in the environment? Because he
has a right to enforce the agreement? Is there any reason not to tax
him on the increase in value of his property as a result of the agree-
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ment? The answer is clearly no. The benefits to A's property are at
least as great as those to B's.
Thus, the effects of externalities upon a piece of property should
always be taken into account, even if they have been caused by an
arrangement initiated by the owner of the benefitted property. This
is equivalent to saying that the effects of easements upon benefitted
properties can be included in the valuation process. The assessing
jurisdiction would not be acting inconsistently by doing this while
simultaneously assuming that the servient estate should be viewed as
unrestricted; as has been noted repeatedly, taking the external effects
of the easement into consideration has nothing to do with the ownership of the rights in the servient estate. As the examples have shown,
a person with no rights at all can be the beneficiary of an externality.
A transfer of rights-which the property tax system ignores-should
not be allowed to mask the creation of externalities, which in and
of themselves can be introduced into the valuation process.
Were this rule applied to the Twin Lakes case, the homes surrounding the golf course would have been taxed according to the
full $1,141,108 increase in value. Such a result is entirely justified
since the golf course will be there for the indefinite future, and its
close proximity to the homes will continue to increase their value.11 0
The assessing authorities should be allowed to take account of this
very concrete, externality-induced increase in market value.
V. THE POLICY PERSPECTIvE
The theme of this paper has been that for the purposes of taxing
burdened property, private restrictive agreements need not be recognized by an assessing jurisdiction. There will, however, be instances
in which a jurisdiction does wish to recognize particular types of restrictive agreements in order to encourage certain desired land uses.
This possibility suggests two important questions: (1) What restrictive
agreements should a jurisdiction recognize? (2) What conduct by the
jurisdiction should be held to constitute such recognition?
The latter question is the more easily answered. The simplest
case would be where the jurisdiction has prohibited a particular use
of a property; to treat the landowner as if he could disregard the
110. As noted earlier, the golf course was open to persons outside of the develop-

ment, but could not attract sufficient members to be profitable. Thus, the increases in
value of the homes were clearly due to the nearby presence of the golf course as open

space, and not as a result of any special rights to become members of the course.
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prohibition would be a fraud. Consequently, zoning restrictions
should not be disregarded.1 1' Admittedly, such restrictions often
change over time, and thus may not permanently bind a landowner.
The effect of the restriction on present market value may nevertheless
be determined, and should be recognized.
A second important category of restrictions that should be recognized comprises those that have been implicitly encouraged by the
jurisdiction. The Twin Lakes case provides an example. There, the
developer had set aside land for a golf course precisely because the
zoning laws gave favorable treatment to developments containing open
space areas. 112 Such encouragement should be sufficient to estop the
government from taxing the property as if it were in an unrestricted
state. In essence, favorable property tax treatment should be part of
the landowner's side of the quid pro quo by which the agreement is
created.
Finally, there may be explicit governmental approval of private
restrictions. Jurisdictions can establish procedures under which landowners wishing to restrict land for particular purposes will be allowed
to file papers describing the land and the proposed restriction. The
taxing jurisdiction then "validates" the agreement, consenting to tax
the property only in its restricted state. Of course, to avoid misuse of
this system, it would be necessary to ensure that proposed restrictions
will in fact be maintained over time; otherwise, an owner could get
reduced assessments for several years and then sell the property to a
third party who would not be bound by the restriction.
Actually, validation systems of this nature do exist. They have
emerged primarily in open space preservation schemes, particularly
in some of the western states where metropolitan areas are expanding
rapidly, with the result that farm land surrounding cities is being converted to commercial and residential uses to meet the demands of
growing population pressures. 1 3 The potential for such conversion in
turn drives up the value of the remaining farmland and thus raises
its tax assessment. To ease the burden on the farmers who wish to
keep their land, many states have consequently instituted systems that
permit restricted use assessment.
The system adopted in California is typical. The California property tax statute includes a subdivision entitled "Valuation of Open111. See generally Heller, supra note 6.
112. 87 Wash. 2d at 2-3, 548 P.2d at 539.
113. See Sullivan, The Greening of the Taxpayer, 9 WiLLAmETT.E L.J. 1 (1973)-
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Space Land Subject to an Enforceable Restriction," under which spe,
cial "open-space" regions are set up within the state.1 4 Persons owning land within these regions can, if they so desire, restrict their land
by means of a number of permissible arrangements. In every case,
however, the state is made a party to the agreement, and thus may enforce it." 5 In return, the restriction will be recognized for property
assessment purposes.
One question remains: which types of restrictive agreements
should a jurisdiction recognize? To answer this question, it is first
necessary to examine the effect of recognizing a restriction. As suggested above, the better way to tax property is according to an assumption of unrestricted use, an assumption designed to maintain the tax
base at a high level. To the extent that it recognizes restrictive agreements the taxing jurisdiction effectively decreases its tax base. In effect, the jurisdiction is making a tax expenditure-it is spending
money by foregoing a given amount of tax revenue.'"
An analysis of the merits of tax expenditures could take the
space of several articles this size. For the moment, it is sufficient to
observe that their efficacy is disputed, and with good reason.1 7 In
general, the purpose of a tax expenditure is to induce a change in
someone's behavior. To the extent that its purpose is achieved an expenditure may be worthwhile, but even then one must question
whether putting the tax dollars to direct use would have produced
the intended result more economically.
There is one strong indication that property tax expenditures are
likely to be as ineffective as those made in the income tax area. Over
thirty states have open space preservation statutes, and the virtually
unanimous conclusion is that these statutes are ineffective." 8 The
comments of Henry Aaron are typical: "In practice, these agreements
amount to preferred assessment. . . . If state governments conclude
114. CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-22 (West Supp. 1976). See generally Mix,

Restricted Use Assessment in California, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 259 (1971); Comment,
13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 284 (1974).
115. See Comment, supra note 114, at 291.
116. See generally S. SURRExY, PATHWAYS To TAX REFORM (1974).
117. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970).
Professor Surrey notes that most tax expenditures are wasteful, inefficient, and inequitable. Moreover, any benefits from the allegedly simple administrability of such measures
are more than offset by the losses which result when tax legislation authorities are
required to devise substantive regulations for areas they know little or nothing about.
118. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 113; INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF ASSESSING
OFFICERS, supra note 94.
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that development surrounding urban areas should be restricted, in119
struments of direct control are at hand."
This result should at least make jurisdictions very wary of attempting tax expenditures in the property tax field. Moreover, it also
stresses the importance of recognizing the proper tax treatment of restricted property. Taxing jurisdictions that needlessly take private
restrictive agreements into account in the valuation process err twice.
Not only do they forego tax revenue; they in effect spend that foregone money in an inefficient manner.
119. H.

AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY

TAx? 85-86 (1975).

